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DETERMINING THE DISCHARGEABILITY OF
FRAUDULENT CLAIM SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS IN
BANKRUPTCY
"No one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud,or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or
to acquireproperty by his own crime." 1
I.

INTRODUCTION

Inherent in the Bankruptcy Code2 (the "Code") is the notion of the
"fresh start," a policy whereby a debtor can obtain relief from certain debts
in order to pull themselves out from under a mountain of overwhelming
debt.3 Legally known as discharge, the process has endured multiple revisions of the federal bankruptcy statute first enacted in 1898.4 That is not to
say, however, that a debtor can freely discharge any and all debts owed to a
creditor. 5 Indeed, federal bankruptcy law sets forth a specific list of nondischargeable debts that survive the bankruptcy discharge process and remain the debtor's obligation.6 Nondischargeable debts reflect the policy
decision by Congress that some financial obligations should not be discharged
because they are the result of the debtor's bad faith or miscon7
duct.
One such discharge exemption prohibits the discharge of any debt
obtained by fraud, false pretenses, or misrepresentation. 8 Essentially, if an
individual commits fraud that results in a debt to another, that individual
may not discharge the debt in a subsequent bankruptcy action. 9 Congress
1 Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188, 190 (N.Y. 1898).
2 Codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (2000) (setting forth federal bankruptcy statute).

3 See In re Boone, 215 B.R. 386, 390 (Bankr. S. D. I11.1997) (describing notion of
"fresh start" through bankruptcy).
4 Compare 11 U.S.C. § 522 (2000) (setting forth discharge process subsequent to
enactment of Federal Bankruptcy Code), with 11 U.S.C. § 24 (1976) (setting forth pre-1978
discharge process under Bankruptcy Act of 1898 as amended).
5 See 11 U.S.C. § 523 (2000) (precluding discharge of certain debts under current
Bankruptcy Code).
6 See id.
7 See 3 NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE 2d § 47:1, at 47-4 (William L.

Norton. Jr., ed. 1998) (noting Congress' intent in precluding discharge of certain debts).
8 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) (establishing fraud exception to bankruptcy discharge).
9 See id.
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included the fraud exemption to preclude a debtor from benefiting from his
fraudulent actions through a bankruptcy discharge. 0
An issue arises, however, when a creditor asserts a fraud claim
against a debtor, and the parties settle the dispute before trial. Stated simply, assume that two parties, creditor ("C") and debtor ("D"), have settled a
fraud claim out of court through an agreement that requires C to forego any
legal remedies in exchange for D's execution of a promissory note to compensate C for its loss. Under this scenario, D now owes a debt to C for the
amounts due under the note. Subsequent to the entry of the settlement
agreement, D encounters economic hardship and defaults on the repayment
of the note to C. D then seeks bankruptcy protection, including the discharge of his debt to C. Does the debt traceable to the alleged fraudulent
actions of the debtor remain intact, or does the settlement agreement supercede and replace the original fraud claim?
Currently, there is no definitive answer to this question. The
Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits hold that the settlement agreement acts
as a novation, replacing the original tort-based fraud claim with a contractbased claim governed solely by the terms of the agreement." Absent a
challenge by a creditor, the Code generally permits the discharge of a debt
as a matter of course.' 2 As a result, the debt owed under the settlement
agreement
is discharged, and the fraudulent debtor receives his "fresh
13
start.'

In contrast, the District of Columbia and Eleventh Circuits hold that
the underlying nature of the debt is determinative when the debt originated
from the fraudulent conduct of the debtor. 14 Thus, notwithstanding the
execution of the agreement settling the fraud claim, the underlying debt
originating in fraud remains intact and is not dischargeable under the

'0 See 3 NORTON, supra note 7 and accompanying text.

1 See Archer v. Warner (In re Warner), 283 F.3d 230, 232 (4th Cir. 2002), cert.
granted, Archer v. Warner, 122 S. Ct. 2618 (2002) (holding settlement agreement in fraud
dispute acts as novation replacing fraud debt with contract debt); Key Bar Investments, Inc.
v. Fischer (In re Fischer), 116 F.3d 388, 389 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding same); In re West, 22
F.3d 775, 777 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding same).
12 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 727 (2000) (providing discharge under chapter 7 liquidation
proceedings); § 944 (providing discharge of debtor under chapter 9 municipality reorganization plan); § 1141 (providing discharge of debtor under chapter 11 reorganization); §
1328 (providing discharge of debtor under chapter 13 reorganization of individuals); see
also FED. R. BANKR. P. 4007(c) (proscribing mechanism to determine dischargeability of
debt under § 523).
13 See case cited supra note 11 (holding fraudulent debt settlement agreement as
novation replacing fraud debt with contract debt).
14 See United States v. Spicer (In re Spicer), 57 F.3d 1152, 1157 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
(holding underlying fraudulent nature of debt determinative for dischargeability decision);
Greenberg v. Schools, 711 F.2d 152, 156 (11 th Cir. 1983) (holding same).
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Code. 15 At the time of this writing, the United States Supreme Court has
yet to resolve this dispute.
The practical effect of this disconnect among the federal circuits is
twofold: first, the split among the courts discourages the settlement of the
underlying fraud claim as neither the creditor nor the debtor has any incentive to execute a settlement agreement.' 6 Second, this judicial disconnect
places significant strain on the parties, and thus the courts, to fully litigate
the underlying fraud claim. 17 This note argues that the courts should look
to the underlying nature of the debt owed and fully investigate the merits
of the fraud claim in order to make the discharge determination. Such a
rule more fully reflects Congress' intent in specifying certain debts that are
nondischargeable in bankruptcy due to the bad faith or misconduct of the
debtor.' 8 Furthermore, given the Supreme Court's interpretation of §
523(a)(2)(A) to encompass "all liability arising from fraud,"' 19 regardless of
form, the settlement agreement establishes a liability in the debtor that is
the direct progeny of the debtor's alleged fraudulent activities, which the
Code precludes from discharge in bankruptcy.
Part II of this note presents a brief history of the Bankruptcy Code
and the policy rationale underlying the fraud exception to discharge. Part
III describes the current disconnect among the federal circuit courts conceming the dischargeability of settlement agreements for fraudulent debts
and examines the reasoning employed by those courts that have produced
conflicting interpretations of § 523(a)(2)(A). Part IV argues that the courts
15

See In re Spicer, 57 F.3d at 1157 (holding change in form from fraud claim to

settlement agreement preserves debt derived through fraud); Greenberg, 711 F.2d at 156
(holding same).
16 See In re Warner, 283 F.3d at 236-37 (holding settlement agreement in fraud dispute acts as novation replacing fraud debt with contract debt); In re Fischer, 116 F.3d at
390 (holding same); In re West, 22 F.3d at 778 (holding same). But see In re Spicer, 57
F.3d at 1157 (holding underlying fraudulent nature of debt determinative for purposes of §
523(a)(2) dischargeability review); Greenberg, 711 F.2d at 156 (holding same). Depending
upon the jurisdiction in which the bankruptcy proceeding is filed, the settlement agreement
may either fully discharge the debt grounded in fraud, thus leaving the creditor holding
nothing but an empty promise to pay, or it may create (i.e., preserve) a nondischargeable
debt, a situation the debtor is seeking to avoid.
17 See Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 138 (1979) (positing whether creditor's failure
to pursue fraud claim betrays weakness in case). In this instance, the creditor may be compelled to plead and argue a weak fraud claim in the prior non-bankruptcy action, or conversely, withhold the fraud claim altogether to preserve it for a possible bankruptcy proceeding in the future. As a result, both parties incur greater expense by having to undergo a
full trial on the fraud claim, and the courts must expend a portion of its limited resources on
resolving a dispute that might otherwise lend itself to private settlement.
18 See 11 U.S.C. § 523 (2000) (relating to nondischargeable debts in bankruptcy); see
also 3 NORTON, supra note 7, § 47:1 at 47-4 (discussing Congress' intent in precluding
certain debts from discharge in bankruptcy).
19Cohen v. de la Cruz, 523 U.S. 213, 215 (1998) (holding treble damages award
under state consumer statute is liability arising from debtor's fraud).
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should look to the underlying facts and circumstances of the debt to discern
whether the debt arose from actual fraudulent behavior on the part of the
Debtor, rather than seek to interpret the intentions of the parties in executing the subsequent settlement agreement. Part V concludes that the facts
and circumstances analysis more closely comports with Congress' intent to
exclude certain debts from discharge in bankruptcy.
II.

A.

BRIEF HISTORY OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE AND THE
FRAUD EXCEPTION TO DISCHARGE

Bankruptcy Background

The concept of bankruptcy traces its roots back nearly five hundred
years to English statutes enacted under Henry VIII in 1540.20 The early
English code was available only to merchants, and focused wholly on
creditor's remedies which included access and seizure of a debtor's chattels, or in some instances, to the debtor himself.21 It would take another
160 years before the bankruptcy process would be made available to nonmerchants, and the
notion of asset seizure and sale to settle debts would
22
come into being.
The modem Bankruptcy Code seeks to balance competing interests:
providing debtors with a "fresh start" free from burdensome debt obligations, while protecting creditors rights to fair treatment and an equitable
share of the bankruptcy estate.23 American bankruptcy law finds its origins
in the United States Constitution through which the framers saw fit to empower Congress, "[t]o establish ...uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States ...

,24 and "[t]o make all Laws

which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers .... ,25 As James Madison noted in the Federalist Papers,

The power of establishing uniform laws of bankruptcy is so
intimately connected with the regulation of commerce, and
will prevent so many frauds where the parties or their prop-

20

See 34 & 35 Hen. 8, c. 4 (1542-1543) (Eng.) (establishing first English statutory

bankruptcy law).
21 See 1 NORTON, supra note 7, § 1:2, at 1-2 - 1-3 (discussing early English bankruptcy laws).
22 See 4 Ann., c. 17 (1705) (Eng.) (amending English bankruptcy statute to encompass non-merchant debtors).
23 See In re Boone, 215 B.R. 386, 390 (Bankr. S. D. Ill. 1997) (describing balancing
competing interests under Bankruptcy Code).
24 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
25 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
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erty may lie or be removed into the different States, that the
expediency of it seems not likely to be drawn into question. 26
While this represents the only mention of bankruptcy in the Federalist Papers, Norton notes that the American colonies were plagued by inconsistencies and conflicts in commercial transactions, and posits that the
founders
viewed bankruptcy as an important method to address such dis27
putes.

The early legislative history of U.S. bankruptcy law indicates that
Congress wielded its bankruptcy power sparingly, enacting laws that were
limited in both time and scope. 28 The first comprehensive federal bankruptcy law was enacted in the wake of the Civil War, but it survived for a
mere ten years before it was repealed. 29 The Bankruptcy Act of 1898
represents the first permanent federal bankruptcy statute.3 ° Congress,
while amending
its provisions multiple times in the century, has never seen
31
fit to repeal it.
The current Bankruptcy Code, enacted in 1978, is the direct descendant of the 1898 Act, although today it holds little resemblance to its
predecessor. 32 The Bankruptcy Code ushered in sweeping structural and
substantive revisions to federal bankruptcy law.33 The 1978 Bankruptcy
Act updated and overhauled the system originally crafted in the "horse and
buggy age" to reflect the modem demands placed on an antiquated and
26 THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 239 (James Madison)
27 See I NORTON, supra note 7, § 1:3, at 1-5.
28

(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999).

See, e.g., Act of August 19, 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440 (1841) (repealed 1843); Act of

April 4, 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19 (1800) (repealed 1803 and enacted following economic
turmoil in wake of American Revolution).
29 See Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517 (1867) (repealed 1877); see
also I
NORTON, supra note 7, § 1:3, at 1-6 - 1-7 (noting 1867 Act repealed due to abuses in administration).
30 See Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (establishing predecessor statute to
current Bankruptcy Code).
31 See Act of February 5, 1903, ch. 487, 32 Stat. 797 (amending 1898 Act); Act of
June 22, 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 (amending 1898 Act and representing last significant
pre-1978 Act amendment).
32 See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978)
(codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330) (repealing 1898 act and substituting current Bankruptcy Code therefore). Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 401(a), 92 Stat. 2682 provided that, "The
Bankruptcy Act [Act July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat 544, as amended] is repealed." Id.
33 Compare 11 U.S.C. § 101-1330 (2000) (providing present structure and provisions
of modem Bankruptcy Code), with II U.S.C. §§ 1-755 (1976) (indicating structure and
provisions of pre-1978 Bankruptcy Act). The 1978 amendments that produced the modem
Code were partially the result of the findings and recommendations issued by the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, which Congress created in 1970. See
Bankruptcy Study Commission, Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468 (1970). The Commission
filed its report and recommendations with Congress in 1973. See S. REP. No. 95-989, at 1
(1978). House and Senate Committees held multiple hearings and markups before finally
settling on the language for the 1978 Act. See S. REP. No. 95-989, at 3 (1978).
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burdensome system.34

Congress enacted the 1978 Code to reflect the

growth of consumer credit and adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code
by many states.35 The development of modem commercial financing, and
new, more sophisticated systems of payment, strained the36application of
the 1898 Act to modem business and commercial activities.
In adopting the 1978 Code, Congress sought to maintain and enhance the concept of the "fresh start." 37 Within the context of the straight
bankruptcy liquidation, the "fresh start" allows the debtor to retain certain
exempt assets to assist them in resurrecting themselves from bankruptcy.38
The Bankruptcy Code specifically lists the assets that the debtor is entitled
to retain subsequent to bankruptcy via the discharge process. 3 9 These exempt assets generally reflect the necessaries of life such as the family
home, one automobile, certain personal and household goods, tools of the
trade, life insurance policies, social health and welfare benefits, and certain
tort judgments. 40 As Congress noted, "[t]he historical purpose of these
exemption laws has been to protect a debtor from his creditors, to provide
him with the basic necessities of life so that even if his creditors levy on all
of his nonexempt property, the debtor will not be left destitute and a public
charge." 4' Courts have recognized the importance of the discharge process, stating in 2one case that the "[d]ischarge is the legal embodiment of the
'fresh start.",A

34 See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 3 (1977) (accompanying House version of 1978
Bankruptcy Reform Act). Congress noted that "[the substantive law of bankruptcy and the
current bankruptcy system was designed in 1898, in the horse and buggy era of consumer
and commercial credit, and was last overhauled in 1938, nearly 40 years ago." Id.
35See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 3 (1977); S. REP. No. 95-989, at 2-3 (1978) (accompanying House and Senate versions of 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act). According to recent
statistics compiled by the American Bankruptcy Institute, non-businesses (i.e., individuals
and families) comprised the overwhelming number of bankruptcies filed in 2001; this group
filed 1,452,030 bankruptcies as compared to 40,099 filed by businesses. See U.S. Bankruptcy
Filings
1980-2001
(Business,
Non-Business,
Total),
at
http://www.abiworld.org/stats/1980annual.html (copy on file with Suffolk University Law
School's Moot Court Honor Board).
36 See 1 NORTON, supra note 7, § 2:1, at 2-2 (William L. Norton, Jr., ed. 1998) (describing modem commercial pressures on antiquated bankruptcy statute).
37See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 125 (describing features of "fresh start"). Congress
noted two critical features of the "fresh start" in enacting the 1978 Amendments: (1) to
provide adequate property so that the debtor may return to normal life, and (2) to discharge
certain assets with full release from creditor's collection attempts. Id.
38 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-784 (2000). Under the straight bankruptcy liquidation process, the debtor surrenders all of his nonexempt assets to the bankruptcy trustee, who, in turn
sells the assets and distributes the proceeds among the debtor's creditors. See also H.R.
REP. No. 95-595, at 126 (1977) (discussing purpose of bankruptcy liquidation).
'9See 11 U.S.C. § 522 (2000) (setting forth assets specifically exempted from bankruptcy estate).
40 See 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) (listing specific exempted assets).
41 H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 126 (1977).
42 In re Walker, 180 B.R. 834, 840 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1995).
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The discharge aspect of bankruptcy has been an integral part of the
modem Bankruptcy Code since it was first enacted in 1898. 43 Multiple
sections of the current code, and its far reaching effects, demonstrate the
importance of the discharge process. 44 The discharge generally arises as a
matter of right in the debtor as the Code states that the debtor "may exempt" certain statutory property from the bankruptcy estate. 45 More importantly, the discharge operates as a permanent injunction against any
action or effort to collect a debt, prohibiting the creditor from contacting
the debtor in any way once the discharge takes effect. 46 As the Supreme
Court stated, "[t]hrough discharge, the Bankruptcy Act provides 'a new
opportunity in life and a clear field for future efforts,
unhampered by the
47
pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt."'
While courts narrowly construe the discharge in favor of the debtor,
courts also give strong consideration to satisfying a creditor's claim against
the debtor's estate.48 Congress limited the availability of the discharge to
the unfortunate debtor who otherwise acted in good faith. 49 To this end,
the 1978 Amendments, through § 523, preserved the policy by exempting
certain debts from discharge and obligating the debtor to repay such

43 See Act of July 1, 1898, § 14, 30 stat. 544, 550 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 32 (1976))
(permitting discharge of certain debts through bankruptcy).
44 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 727 (2000) (providing discharge under chapter 7 liquidation
proceedings); § 944 (providing discharge of debtor under chapter 9 municipality reorganization plan); § 1141 (providing discharge of debtor under chapter 11 reorganization); §
1328 (providing discharge of debtor under chapter 13 reorganization of individuals).
4. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (2000) (requiring debtor to select either federal or state
bankruptcy exemptions). Note that § 522(b)(2) requires the debtor to affirmatively elect to
take the federal exemptions within fifteen days of filing its petition under either I1 U.S.C. §
301 (2000) (voluntary, i.e., debtor driven petition) or II U.S.C. § 303 (2000) (involuntary,
i.e., creditor driven petition) or the entry of the order for relief or the debtor will be deemed
to have taken the exemptions set forth under relevant state bankruptcy law. See 11 U.S.C. §
522(b)(2).
46 See 11 U.S.C. § 524 (2000) (voiding any judgment and precluding creditor's efforts to collect on the debt); see also S. REP. No. 95-989, at 80 (1978) (noting § 524 expansion of prior bankruptcy law prohibiting creditor contact with debtor subsequent to discharge). The Senate in its legislative report stated that § 524 is "intended to ensure that
once a debt is discharged, the debtor will not be pressured in any way to repay it," and that
the discharge "extinguishes the debt, and creditors may not attempt to avoid that." Id. The
Senate further noted that § 14f of the prior 1898 Act prohibited such acts as "dunning by
telephone or letter, or indirectly through friends, relatives, or employers, harassment, threats
of repossession, and the like." Id.
47 Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 128 (1979) (quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292
U.S. 234, 244 (1934)).
48 See United States v. Spicer (In re Spicer), 57 F.3d 1152, 1156 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
(noting balancing of creditor and debtor interests' fundamental principle of Federal Bankruptcy Code).
49 See Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 287 (1991) (limiting bankruptcy discharge to
good-faith debtor).
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debts. 50 As the U.S. District Court for the Southern5 District of Ohio stated
in HartfordAccident & Indemnity Co. v. Flanagan, !
It is the purpose of the Bankruptcy Act, among other things,
to release an honest, unfortunate, and insolvent debtor from
the burden of oppressive debts and to restore him to business
activity. This is done in the interest of society and it has
been held that the act should be liberally construed to that
end. But, too, the act should be liberally construed so as to
prevent the discharge in bankruptcy of a liability which
would
not exist but for the fraudulent conduct of the bank52
rupt.

Thus, as Norton observes, the exemptions from the statutory discharge reflect the policy decision
by Congress that certain debts should
53
survive the bankruptcy process.
The fraud exemption has been the focus of debate among the federal
circuit courts, specifically with respect to the dischargeability of settlement
agreements that are the direct product of fraud claims against the debtor.54
Greater discussion of the origins and application of the fraud exemption is
necessary to fully comprehend the nature of this division.

50 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(l)-(18) (2000) (specifying categories of nondischargeable

debts). The section sets forth sixteen categories of debts that are not dischargeable in bankruptcy, including: certain tax liabilities owed; money, property, services, or credit obtained
by false pretenses, misrepresentation, or fraud; fraud or defalcation while acting in fiduciary
capacity, embezzlement, or larceny; alimony and child support; willful or malicious injury
by debtor to another entity or property of another entity; fines, penalties, or other forfeitures
payable to the government; education loans provided by the government; death or personal
injury cause while debtor was operating a vehicle under the influence; and criminal fines
among others. See id.
51 28 F. Supp. 415 (S.D. Ohio 1938).
52 Id. at 419.
53 See 3 NORTON,

supra note 7, § 47:1, at 47-4. Norton continues by stating that
certain debts should be excluded from discharge because of overriding public policy relating to the type of debt, the manner in which the liability was incurred, or the underlying
social responsibility that the debt represents." Id.
-4 See In re Spicer, 57 F.3d at 1157 (holding underlying fraudulent nature of debt
determinative in nondischargeability determination); Greenberg v. Schools, 711 F.2d 152,
156 (11 th Cir. 1983) (holding same). But see Archer v. Warner (In re Warner), 283 F.3d
230, 236-37 (4th Cir. 2002), cert. granted, Archer v. Warner, 122 S. Ct. 2618 (2002) (holding settlement agreement in fraud dispute acts as novation replacing fraud debt with contract debt); Key Bar Investments, Inc. v. Fischer (In re Fischer), 116 F.3d 388, 390 (9th Cir.
1997) (holding same); In re West, 22 F.3d 775, 778 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding same).
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Policy Rationale of FraudulentDebt Exception to Discharge

Congress, through the 1978 Act, preserved the policy that debts obtained through fraud or false statements are not dischargeable in bankruptcy. 55 Specifically, the Bankruptcy Code states that bankruptcy "does
not discharge any individual debtor from any debt.., for money [or] property... to the extent obtained by... false pretenses, a false representation,
or actual fraud., 56 This section illustrates the intention of Congress to provide the debtor with a "fresh start" provided that it does not come at the
expense of defrauded third parties.
The United States Supreme Court
noted in Grogan v. Garner58 that, "Congress evidently concluded that the
creditors' interest in recovering full payment of debts in these
categories
59
outweighed the debtors' interest in a complete 'fresh start.'
At first glance, the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Brown v. Felsen60 arguably stands for the proposition that Congress intended a full inquiry into the underlying nature of the debt for the purposes
of determining dischargeability under the Bankruptcy Code. 6' There is
division among the federal circuit courts, however, as to the applicability
of Brown to the fraud discharge exemption.62
The Court in Brown considered whether a bankruptcy court was
confined to reviewing the judgment and record of a prior state court fraud
proceeding in determining the dischargeability of the disputed debt.63 The
55 Compare Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-588, § 523(a)(2), 92
Stat. 2549, 2590 (1978) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)), with Act of July 1, 1898, §

17a(2), 30 Stat. 544, 550 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 35(a)(2) (1976)).
56 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) (2000).
57 See In re Spicer, 57 F.3d at 1156 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (citing In re Rush, 33 B.R. 97,
98 (Bankr. D. Me. 1983)) (recognizing bankruptcy discharge intended for good faith
debtor).
58 498 U.S. 279 (1991).
59 See Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 287 (1991) (examining legislative history
underlying "fresh start" and fraud exemption).
6 442 U.S. 127 (1979).
61 See Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 138 (1979) (noting history of Bankruptcy Code
indicates full inquiry into nature of debt).
62 See In re Spicer, 57 F.3d at 1157 (holding underlying fraudulent nature of debt
determinative in nondischargeability determination); Greenberg v. Schools, 711 F.2d 152,
156 (1lth Cir. 1983) (holding same). But see Archer v. Warner (In re Warner), 283 F.3d
230, 236-37 (4th Cir. 2002), cert. granted, Archer v. Warner, 122 S. Ct. 2618 (2002) (holding settlement agreement in fraud dispute acts as novation replacing fraud debt with contract debt); Key Bar Investments, Inc. v. Fischer (In re Fischer), 116 F.3d 388, 390 (9th Cir.
1997) (holding same); In re West, 22 F.3d 775, 778 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding same).

63 See Brown, 442 U.S. at 129 (holding bankruptcy court to review underlying facts
of fraud claim). Brown was the guarantor for Felsen and Felsen's luxury car dealership. Id.
at 128. Brown alleged in a civil suit that Felsen induced him to guarantee several loans
through fraudulent misrepresentation and non-disclosure of material facts. Id. The parties
settled the suit by stipulation. Id. Soon thereafter, Felsen filed a voluntary bankruptcy
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parties in that case ultimately settled the dispute by stipulation. 64 Felsen,
the debtor, argued that the prior stipulation and court proceeding did not
result in a finding of fraud and that res judicata barred relitigation on the
issue of the nature of the debt.65 In rejecting Felsen's argument, the Court
reasoned that Brown was not asserting a new ground for recovery, but
rather was seeking to counter the "new defense of bankruptcy which [Felsen] has interposed between [Brown] and the sum determined to be due
him., 66 The Court favored the policy permitting the bankruptcy court to
make an accurate determination regarding whether the debtor did, in fact,
engage in deceit or fraud.6 7 Furthermore, the Court stated that the bankruptcy court should weigh all of the available evidence to determine
whether the creditor's failure or refusal to pursue a fraud claim in an earlier
action "betrays a weakness in his case on the merits., 68
Creditors, however, are not automatically entitled to an order prohibiting the discharge of a debt originating in fraud. Under the Bankruptcy
Code, and its accompanying rules, the creditor has the burden of pleading
and proving the nondischargeability of the debt in question.69 Subsequent
Supreme Court precedent requires the creditor to prove its case by a preponderance of the evidence. 7° Furthermore, the creditor still must prove
petition and sought to have his debt to Brown discharged. Id.
64 See Brown, 442 U.S. at 128.
65 See id. at 129 (describing debtor's argument that fraud debt settled by prior agreement). Res judicata provides that a "final judgment on the merits bars further claims by
parties or their privies based on the same cause of action." Id. (citing Montana v. United
States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979)).
66 Brown, 442 U.S. at 133.
67 See id. at 138 (holding res judicata no bar to full inquiry into fraudulent nature
of
disputed debt). The Court further noted that the plaintiff is master of the complaint and is
entitled to selecting those causes of action which he believes are most advantageous to him.
Id. Failure in that instance to raise a claim of fraud should not serve to bar such an assertion
in a later bankruptcy action to collect on a debt. Id. at 137.
68 See id. at 138.
69 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(c)(1) (2000) (permitting discharge of debt absent creditor
objection and/or judicial determination of nondischargeability). § 523(c)(I) states that the
"debtor shall be discharged from a debt of the kind specified in paragraph (2)... of subsection (a) of this section, unless, on request of the creditor to whom such debt is owed, and
after notice and a hearing, the court determines such debt to be excepted from discharge...
ld; see also FED R. BANKR. P. 4007(c) (relating to determination of dischargeability of a
debt under § 523(a)(2)). Rule 4007(c) requires the creditor to file its complaint seeking a
determination of the dischargeability of a debt under § 523(c) within 60 days from the first
date set for the meeting of the creditors under § 341(a) (stating such meeting shall commence within a reasonable time after the entry of the order for relief). FED R. BANKR. P.
4007(c). The court may for cause extend the deadline for filing the complaint. Id. Taken
together, § 523(c) and Rule 4007(c) impose upon the creditor the obligation to file its complaint to determine the issue of dischargeability of debts under § 523(a)(2) before the 60
day deadline, or the debt will be discharged as a matter of right.
70 See Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 288 (1991) (holding creditor must prove
nondischargeability under § 523 by preponderance of evidence standard).
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each element of the fraud claim to prevail on its motion for nondischargeability of the debt.7'
The Court in Grogan held that the preponderance of the evidence
standard,72 rather than the clear and convincing standard,73 applies to all
exceptions to dischargeability under § 523 of the Bankruptcy Code.74
Given that the creditor must carry the burden on the issue of dischargeability, the Court noted with concern that the clear and convincing standard
poses a higher burden of proof, and thus favors the debtor, while the preponderance standard more evenly spreads the risk of error between the
creditor and debtor.75 Moreover, the Grogan Court reaffirmed its position
that the exceptions from discharge evidenced Congress' intent to preserve
debt obligations obtained through fraud and doubted that Congress would
favor a standard of proof (i.e., clear76and convincing proof) that favors the
perpetrator of fraud over the victim.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in In re Mercer, applying the
preponderance of the evidence standard, articulated the elements of fraud
that the creditor must prove in order to obtain a nondischarge order from a
bankruptcy court.77

The Mercer court noted Congress chose to use the

term "actual fraud" in drafting § 523; legislative construction that the Fifth
Circuit interpreted as "positive" rather than "constructive" fraud. 78 Fraud
71 See AT&T Universal Card Servs. v. Mercer (In re Mercer), 246 F.3d 391, 403 (5th
Cir. 2001) (holding creditors must prove elements of fraud to prevail on claim for nondischargeability of debt arising in fraud).
72

See BLACK'S

LAW DICTIONARY

1201 (7th ed. 1999).

BLACK'S

defines the prepon-

derance standard as being of "superior evidentiary weight that ... [is] sufficient to induce a
fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other." Id.
73

See

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

577 (7th ed. 1999).

BLACK'S

defines the clear and

convincing standard as requiring "the thing to be proved is highly probable or reasonably
certain." Id.
74 See Grogan, 498 U.S. at 291 (noting absence of express standard in Code when
Congress expressly includes standard in other statutory fraud provisions). The Court stated
that Congress had chosen the preponderance standard in other substantive causes of action
for fraud. Id. at 288. See also 31 U.S.C. § 373 1(c) (2000) (False Claims Act); 12 U.S.C. §
1833a(e) (2000) (describing civil penalties for fraud involving financial institutions). Indeed, Congress chose the preponderance standard to govern discharge determinations under
11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(4) (2000) that relate to nondischargeability of debts from fraud while
acting in a fiduciary capacity. Id.; see also H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 384 (1977).
75 See Grogan, 498 U.S. at 286-87 (recognizing policy balancing debtor and creditor
interests).
76 See id. at 287 (deducing Congress' intent in precluding discharge of certain debts).
77 See AT&T Universal Card Servs. v. Mercer (In re Mercer), 246 F.3d 391, 403 (5th
Cir. 2001) (stating necessary elements for fraudulent debt claim).
79 See id. at 407. The Fifth Circuit relied on the Supreme Court's statement in Ames
v. Moir, 138 U.S. 306 (1891), that "fraud in the act ... defining [nondischargeability] ...
means positive fraud, or fraud in fact, involving moral turpitude or intentional wrong...
and not implied fraud, or fraud in law, which may exist without the imputation of bad faith
or immorality." Ames, 138 U.S. at 311; see also Anastas v. American Sav. Bank (In re
Anastas), 94 F.3d 1280, 1286 (9th Cir. 1996) (interpreting fraud as used in § 523(a)(2)(A)
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in the most general sense is defined as a "knowing misrepresentation of the
truth or concealment of a material fact to induce another to act to his or her
detriment., 79 The Supreme Court, in reviewing the fraud discharge exemption, stated that where Congress employs a term which has accumulated a "settled meaning" under the common law, unless otherwise stated
in the statute, Congress intends to use that established meaning of the
term.8 ° In interpreting the use of the term "actual fraud" as applied to §
523(a)(2)(A) fraudulent debts, the Court, in 1995, recognized that the most
widely accepted manifestation of the common law is the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, which provides that an individual may recover in an
action for fraudulent misrepresentation if that individual actually and justifiably relies on the misrepresentation. 8' Thus a creditor must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence: "(1) [debtor] made a representation; (2) it
was knowingly false; (3) it was made with the intent to deceive [the creditor]; (4) [the creditor] actually and justifiably relied on it; and (5) [the
creditor] sustained a loss as a proximate result of its reliance. 8 2 The creditor, under the fraud discharge exemption,83still must prove all of the elements of fraud to carry its burden of proof.
Congress, more importantly, has broadened the scope of the fraud
discharge exemption since passing the 1898 Bankruptcy Act.84 Specifically, the 1898 Act prohibited discharge of "judgments in actions for
85
frauds, or obtaining property by false pretenses or false representations.'
Congress broadened this exception in 1903 to include all "liabilities for
,,86
obtaining property by false pretenses or false representations. ' 6 Finally,
in enacting the Code in 1978, Congress further broadened the scope of §

as actual or positive fraud rather than fraud implied by law); RecoverEdge L.P. v. Pentecost, 44 F.3d 1284, 1292 (5th Cir. 1995) (noting fraud as used in § 523(a)(2)(A) meaning
fraud involving intentional wrong rather than implied in law).
79 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

670 (7th ed. 1999).

80 See Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 69 (1995) (citing Community for Creative NonViolence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739 (1989)) (articulating Court's policy for resolving
meaning of disputed statutory terms).
8 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TORTS § 537 (1977) (stating general rule of fraudulent misrepresentation as including justifiable reliance); see also Field, 516 U.S. at 70 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 537 and justifiable reliance as element of fraudulent misrepresentation).
82 In re Mercer, 246 F.3d at 403 (5th Cir. 2001).
83 See id. (holding creditor must prove fraud elements under § 523(a)(2)(A)
nondischargeability claim).
84 See Cohen v. de la Cruz, 523 U.S. 213, 221 (1998) (describing evolution of fraud
discharge exemption through present Code).
85 Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 550 (emphasis added) (establishing 11 U.S.C.
§ 35a(2) nondischargeability under 1898 Bankruptcy Act and predecessor section to 11
U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) under 1978 Bankruptcy Code).
86 Act of February 3, 1903, ch. 487, 32 Stat. 798 (emphasis added) (amending
11
U.S.C. § 35a(2) nondischargeability under 1898 Bankruptcy Act).
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523 to encompass "any debt ... for money, property, services ... to the
extent obtained by . . . false pretenses, a false representation, or actual
fraud. 87
A recent United States Supreme Court decision in helps clarify the
Court's interpretation of the term "debt" as set forth in the Bankruptcy
Code.88 The Court employed a strict reading of the statutory provisions
defining debt generally within the Code, and used it specifically with respect to the fraud exemption to dischargeability. 89 The Court noted that §
523 exempts "any debt" obtained through fraud. 90 A "debt" is defined in
the Code as a "liability on a claim."9' A "claim," in turn, is defined as a
"right to payment ' 92 that the Court has said "is nothing more nor less than
an enforceable obligation. 9 3 In rendering its decision that treble damages
awarded under a state fraud claim are not dischargeable, the Court stated
that § 523 "prevents the discharge of all liability arising from fraud" and
that the treble damages award under state law falls within that scope. 94
The circuit courts, however, are divided as to whether a settlement agreement resulting from a fraud claim fits within the scope of "any debt" obtained through fraud so as to be nondischargeable under § 523. 95

" 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) (2000) (emphasis added).
88 See Cohen, 523 U.S. at 218 (holding treble damages assessed on state law fraud
action not dischargeable under § 523(a)(2)(A) fraud exemption).

Landlord debtor was

found liable for fraud under New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act and was ordered to repay
tenants for rents charged in excess of that allowed under the local rent control ordinance.
Id. at 215-16. Tenant creditors obtained a judgment that debt from excess rent arose from
fraud and was not dischargeable under the Bankruptcy Code, and the bankruptcy court

ordered treble damages under the state consumer statute. Id. The court further held that the
treble damages awarded under state law was a product of the debtor's fraudulent actions
and therefore not dischargeable. Id. The United States Supreme Court affirmed. Id.
89 See Cohen, 523 U.S. at 218 (interpreting meaning of "debt" under Bankruptcy
Code).
90 Id. (noting use of debt under § 523(a)(2)(A) fraud discharge exception); see also 11
U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) (2000).

9)' 11 U.S.C. § 101(12) (2000) (defining "debt" under Bankruptcy Code).
92 11U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) (defining "claim" under Bankruptcy Code).
93 Pennsylvania Dept. of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 559 (1990).
94 Cohen, 523 U.S. at 215 (emphasis added) (noting use of all liability rather than
debt under § 523(a)(2)(A) fraud discharge exception); see also 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A)
(2000).
95 See United States v. Spicer (In re Spicer), 57 F.3d 1152, 1157 (D.C. Cir. 1995)

(holding underlying fraudulent nature of debt determinative in nondischargeability determination); Greenberg v. Schools, 711 F.2d 152, 156 (11 th Cir. 1983) (holding same). But see
Archer v. Warner (In re Warner), 283 F.3d 230, 236-37 (4th Cir. 2002), cert. granted,
Archer v. Warner, 122 S. Ct. 2618 (2002) (holding settlement agreement in fraud dispute
acts as novation replacing fraud debt with contract debt); Key Bar Investments, Inc. v.
Fischer (In re Fischer), 116 F.3d 388, 390 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding same); In re West, 22
F.3d 775, 778 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding same).

124

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY [Vol. VIII
III. DISAGREEMENTS AMONG THE CIRCUITS

Several federal courts of appeals have considered the issue whether
an agreement settling a fraud claim is dischargeable under § 523, but a
consensus remains elusive. 96 Holdings from the court of appeals can be
placed into two categories: those holding that the settlement agreement
acts as a novation 97 substituting a new debt obligation based in contract for
the original debt based on the tort claim for fraud,9 8 and those holding that
the settlement agreement has no effect on the underlying tort claim because
the foundation of the agreement is based on the alleged fraud. 99
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals most recently addressed the issue of nondischargeability in the context of a settlement agreement traceable to fraud.1'° Holding that the settlement agreement constitutes a novation, the Fourth Circuit concurred with the Ninth' 0 1 and Seventh102 Cir96 See In re Spicer, 57 F.3d at 1157 (holding underlying fraudulent nature of debt
deierminative in nondischargeability determination); Greenberg, 711 F.2d at 156 (holding
same). But see In re Warner, 283 F.3d at 236-37 (holding settlement agreement in fraud
dispute acts as novation replacing fraud debt with contract debt); In re Fischer, 116 F.3d at
390 (holding same); In re West, 22 F.3d at 778 (holding same).
97 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1091 (7th ed. 1999) (defining novation). Black's Law

Dictionary defines novation generally as the "act of substituting for an old obligation a new
one that either replaces an existing obligation with a new obligation or replaces an original
party with a new party." Id.
9" See, e.g., In re Warner, 283 F.3d at 236-37 (holding settlement agreement in fraud
dispute acts as novation replacing fraud debt with contract debt); In re Fischer, 116 F.3d at
390 (holding same); In re West, 22 F.3d 778 (holding same).
99 See In re Spicer, 57 F.3d 1157 (holding underlying fraudulent nature of debt
determinative in nondischargeability determination); Greenberg, 711 F.2d at 156 (holding
same).
1oo See In re Warner, 283 F.3d at 236-37 (describing alleged fraud claim producing
debt). Archer accused Warner of fraudulent misrepresentation relating to the sale of a business. Id. at 233. As part of the pretrial settlement, Warner paid $200,000 to Archer and
provided a promissory note for $100,000. Id. The parties also entered into a written
agreement releasing Warner from any pending and future claims, while neither party admitted liability. Id. When the note came due, Warner failed to make the requisite payment and
sought bankruptcy protection first under chapter 13, which was later converted to chapter 7.
Id. Archer filed an adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy court seeking a determination
that the amount due under the note was not dischargeable under section 523(a)(2)(A). Id. at
233-34.
101See In re Fischer, 116 F.3d at 388 (describing circumstances producing fraudulent
debt claim). In re Fischer concerned a dispute over the sale of an automobile repair shop
by Key Bar Investments, Inc. to Cahn-Fischer Enterprises, Inc. Id. at 389. Cahn-Fischer
asserted that Key Bar misrepresented the income generated by the shop at the time of the
sale, and the parties signed a Compromise Agreement and Mutual Release settling the case.
Id. By its terms, the agreement reduced Cahn-Fischer's outstanding balance on a $125,400
promissory note executed as part of the purchase and sale. Id. A few months later, CahnFischer stopped making payments on the note, and Key Bar demanded payment from Cahn
and Fischer individually, but both refused. Id. Fischer sought bankruptcy protection, and
Key Bar filed a complaint seeking nondischargeability of the note under section
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cuits' positions that parties, by an express term of their agreement, may
substitute a contractual agreement for a tort claim. 0 3 Under this line of
cases, an original tort claim for fraud is extinguished by a purely contractual claim, i.e., the promise to pay in exchange for the promise to forego
legal claims. 104
Courts adopting this line of reasoning place great emphasis on the
0 5
decision by the Seventh Circuit in Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cushing.1
The Appeals Court in Maryland Casualty noted the general rule that a
promissory note is merely evidence of the debt and does not discharge the
debt for which it was given. ° 6 The dischargeability of the note hinges
upon the express terms and conditions of the agreement. 10 7 If the note was
merely accepted as evidence of the debt, the original cause of action upon
which it was executed remains intact. 0 8 If, however, by its express terms,
it is shown that the note was given and received as payment or waiver of
the underlying claim, the note "operates to discharge the original obligation and substitute a new one therefore . . . ."09 Thus, if the note is

founded upon ample consideration, then it becomes a substitute, i.e., a
523(a)(2)(A). Id. Key Bar alleged Fischer misrepresented both the value of the assets he
owned at the time of the sale and the extent of his business operating experience, thus inducing Key Bar to sell the shop to Cahn-Fischer. Id. at 389-90.
102 See In re West, 22 F.3d at 777 (describing alleged fraudulent conduct producing
debt). West was employed as the book keeper for John Oltman. Id. Oltman alleged that
West embezzled more than $100,000 from her employer while serving in that capacity. Id.
West executed a promissory note to Oltman for $75,000, and, in consideration therefore,
Oltman executed a general release and covenant not to sue West for any obligation other
than on the promissory note. Id. West subsequently filed for bankruptcy relief under chapter 7 and listed the promissory note as an unsecured debt. Id. Oltman sought a determination that the note was not dischargeable under section 523(a)(2)(A). Id.
103 See In re Warner, 283 F.3d at 236 (adopting settlement agreement novation rule
from Seventh and Ninth Circuits).
104See In re Warner, 283 F.3d at 237 (citing In re West, 22 F.3d at 778); In re Fischer,
116 F.3d at 390 (citing In re Kelley, 259 F. Supp. 297, 299 (N. D. Cal. 1965)); In re West,
22 F.3d at 777 (citing Maryland Casualty v. Cushing, 171 F.2d 257 (7th Cir. 1948)).
'05 171 F.2d 257 (7th Cir. 1949); see, e.g., In re Warner, 283 F.3d at 236-37; In re
Fischer, 116 F.3d at 390; In re West, 22 F.3d at 777. The dischargeability of the debt in
MarylandCasualty was governed by the provisions of the 1898 Act as amended. Maryland
Casualty, 171 F.2d at 258. Maryland Casualty was the surety in favor of the Mutual National Bank which employed Cushing as a bank teller. Id. During his employment, Cushing converted $15,000 of Mutual National Bank's money for his own use. Id. Mutual
National Bank made a claim against Maryland Casualty as a result of Cushing's actions,
and Maryland Casualty was obliged to pay the bank $14,970 for the loss. Id. Cushing
thereafter executed a promissory note for Maryland Casualty for that amount in exchange
for Maryland Casualty foregoing tort proceedings against him. Id. Cushing soon defaulted
on his payments and subsequently filed for bankruptcy protection. Id.
106 See MarylandCasualty, 171 F.2d at 258 (noting rule relating to promissory notes).
107 See id. (determining dischargeability of promissory notes).
108 See id. (describing circumstances for preserving underlying debt).
109 Id.
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novation, for the original tort claim which is thereby extinguished by its
acceptance.110
In contrast, other circuit courts have held that the underlying nature
of the debt is determinative when considering dischargeability under section 523(a)(2)(A). 111 The lead cases following this line of reasoning are
the District of Columbia Circuit's decision in In re Spicer,' 12 and the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Greenberg v. Schools." 3 These circuits look
primarily to Congress' intent in drafting the Bankruptcy Code.' 14 Specifi15
cally, these circuits look to a trio of Supreme Court decisions; Brown,

'0 See Maryland Casualty, 171 F.2d at 258-59 (establishing circumstance when note
becomes novation for original debt).
111 See United States v. Spicer (In re Spicer), 57 F.3d 1152, 1157 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
(holding underlying fraudulent nature of debt determinative under § 523(a)(2)(A) fraud
discharge exception); Greenberg, 711 F.2d at 156 (holding same).
112 57 F.3d 1152 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Spicer owed a debt to the United States totaling
$339,000 that arose from a settlement of civil claims relating to applications submitted to
the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) for mortgages insured by
the Federal Housing Administration (FHA). Id. at 1154. Spicer was alleged to have intentionally overstated the down payment made by a homebuyer in order to qualify for the FHA
mortgage. Id. As part of his settlement plea, Spicer admitted making similar misstatements
on 81 other mortgage applications submitted to HUD. Id. The buyers on approximately
half of the mortgages subsequently defaulted resulting in approximately $1.8 million in
losses to HUD. Id. The District Court included a restitution order for $340,000 equal to the
profits earned as a result of the misstatements. Id. Spicer reached a settlement agreement
with the U.S. on the pending civil claims, executing two promissory notes totaling $339,000
in exchange for the U.S. explicitly releasing all civil claims against him. Id. Spicer subsequently filed for bankruptcy, and the U.S. filed an adversary complaint in the bankruptcy
seeking a determination that Spicer's debt is not dischargeable under the fraud exemption,
section 523(a)(2)(A). Id.
1'3 711 F.2d 152 (11 th Cir. 1983). As an initial matter, the debt in dispute in this case
arose under an analogous provision of the Bankruptcy Code that precludes discharge for
any debt "for fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity .... " 11 U.S.C. §
523(a)(4) (2000). Id. at 153 (quoting § 523(a)(4)). Greenberg and Schools formed a corporation called the Greater Asbury Collections, Inc., but soon encountered disagreements over
management. Id. Greenberg alleged that Schools in his capacity as managing director had
made unauthorized use of corporate funds for his own personal benefit, engaging in fraud,
misappropriation, and misuse of corporate funds while acting in a fiduciary capacity. Id. at
154. Greenberg and Schools settled the dispute prior to trial with Schools agreeing to pay
Greenberg $90,000 over a period of years, and executing a promissory note on the debt. Id.
Schools defaulted on the initial note, and Greenberg filed suit again on the balance due
directly on the note. Id. Greenberg and Schools executed a second agreement whereby
Schools promised to pay Greenberg $78,102.66 in monthly installments of $892.20. Id.
Schools subsequently filed for bankruptcy, and Greenberg filed an adversary complaint in
the bankruptcy action objecting to the discharge of the debt owed. Id.
114 See In re Spicer, 57 F.3d at 1155-56 (noting Congress intent in granting fresh start
to good faith debtor); Greenberg v. Schools, 711 F.2d 152, 155-56 (11 th Cir. 1983) (holding
full inquiry into fraudulent nature of debt notwithstanding settlement agreement).
"15 442 U.S. at 139 (holding bankruptcy court not confined to review of judgment and
record of prior proceeding in dischargeability determination).
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Grogan,' 6 and Cohen' 7 together, stand for the proposition that the settlement agreement
has no effect on the alleged fraudulent nature of the under8
lying debt."
Under the reasoning in this line of cases, the bankruptcy court
should undertake the fullest possible inquiry into the underlying fraud
claim to discern whether the debt originated in fraud." 9 If the court so
determines that the debt is based in fraud, then the provisions of §
523(a)(2)(A) preclude discharge in bankruptcy. 20 The creditor still must
overcome the burden of proof for each element of the fraud claim,' 2 1 and
the court should analyze the claim using the preponderance of the evidence
to make such determination. 2 2 More importantly, however, is the policy
permeating the discharge provisions of the Bankruptcy Code that debts
originating in fraud are not to be discharged, and that only the "unfortunate
debtor," acting in good faith, should enjoy the benefits of the discharge in
bankruptcy.123 Furthermore, § 523(a)(2)(A) prevents the discharge of all
liability from fraud. As the District of Columbia Circuit aptly stated in In
re Spicer, "we cannot agree with a rule under which, through the alchemy
of a settlement agreement, a fraudulent debtor may transform himself into
a nonfraudulent one, and thereby immunize himself from the strictures of
[section] 523(a)(2)(A).' 2 4 These circuits opine that the holdings in Maryland Casualty and West, and thus the positions assumed by the Fourth,
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, elevate "legal form over substance.' 25

498 U.S. at 283 (holding preponderance standard applies to all dischargeability
determinations covered under § 523(a)).
"'7 523 U.S. at 215 (holding discharge exemption for actual fraud prevents discharge
of all liabilities arising from debtor's fraud).
118 See Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 139 (1979) (permitting full inquiry into fraudu16

lent nature of debt); Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 289 (1991) (establishing creditor's
burden in challenging dischargeability of debt founded in fraud); Cohen v. de la Cruz, 523
U.S. 213, 215 (1998) (holding fraud discharge exemption encompasses all liabilities arising
from debtor's fraud).
119 See Brown, 442 U.S. at 138.
20 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) (prohibiting discharge of any debt obtained by fraud).
121 See AT&T Universal Card Servs. v. Mercer (In re Mercer), 246 F.3d 391, 403 (5th
Cir. 2001) (outlining fraud elements to be proven by creditor).
122See Grogan, 498 U.S. at 286-87 (holding preponderance standard applies to all
dischargeability determinations covered under § 523(a)).
123See United States v. Spicer (In re Spicer), 57 F.3d 1152, 1156-57 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
(limiting discharge to good faith debtor).
124 See id. at 1155. The D.C. Circuit continued by stating that "[tihe purpose of the

fraud exception to the general principle of dischargeability is 'to discourage fraudulent
conduct and to ensure that relief intended for honest debtors does not enure to the benefit of
the dishonest."' Id. (citing In re Wilson, 12 B.R. 363, 370 (Bankr. M.C. Tenn. 1981)).
125 In re Spicer, 57 F.3d at 1155.
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IV.

ANALYSIS

For the purposes of this analysis, recall that C and D, have settled a
fraud claim out of court through an agreement requiring C to forego any
legal remedies in exchange for D's execution of a promissory note to compensate C for its loss. D then seeks bankruptcy protection, including the
discharge of his debt to C.
As an initial matter, the current unsettled state of the law has two
immediate consequences for C and D above: forum shopping and exerting
a burden upon the judicial system. The current disconnect among the circuits effectively sets the starting line for the race to the bankruptcy court's
door, with each party seeking to file its claim in the jurisdiction most advantageous to its respective interests. Thus D would seek to file its claim
in a jurisdiction that treats the settlement agreement with release as a novation, which replaces the fraud-based debt with a contractual debt. Likewise, C would seek to file its claim in a jurisdiction that looks to the underlying nature of the debt in question. It is precisely this judicial disconnect
that the framers sought to eliminate by empowering
Congress to enact a
1 26
uniform Bankruptcy Code for the United States.
Second, in perpetuating this division among the circuit courts, such
disconnect imposes greater strains on an already overburdened judicial
system. For example, C above would more likely fully adjudicate the
fraud claim, or plead and argue what might otherwise constitute a weak
fraud claim, out of concern that the settlement agreement could ultimately
127
result in a discharge of D's debt in a subsequent bankruptcy proceeding.
As a result, the court and the parties themselves must expend considerable
time and resources to resolve an issue that is ideally suited for private settlement.
Moreover, while some courts have argued that the novation reason28
ing actually promotes the settlement and enforcement of agreements,1
both arguments paradoxically create situations where one party has every
incentive to settle the case while the other has no incentive to commence
settlement negotiations. Settlement may be the preferable avenue for the
parties, however, the unsettled nature of the law in this regard essentially
126 See THE FEDERALIST, supra note 26, at 239, and accompanying text.
127

See Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. at 135. The Court in Brown alluded that the rule

precluding consideration of underlying fraud claim would result in creditors relentlessly
pursuing fraud claim in preceding action to protect themselves against possible bankruptcy
in the future.
128 See In re West, 22 F.3d 775, 778 (7th Cir. 1994) (arguing novation encourages
settlement as tort-feasor likely induced to pay aggrieved party larger sum in settlement if
settlement contains release from future claims based on same conduct). Note, however, that
the debtor is in a better position to know the true status of its finances and may knowingly
execute a settlement agreement with the full understanding that the agreement could be
discharged in a subsequent bankruptcy action.
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cuts off this option because neither party has an incentive to enter into a
negotiated settlement.129
In a novation forum, D has every incentive to settle the fraud claim
and to seek release from any and all liability arising therefrom. It is precisely this release from liability that any reasonable debtor would pursue
through settlement. The debtor subsequently could file for bankruptcy
protection and likely discharge the debt owed on the settlement agreement.130 Meanwhile, C above has no incentive to settle the fraud claim and
release D from liability on the underlying claim because the settlement
Given the pomay be discharged in D's subsequent bankruptcy action.
tential that the entire debt on the settlement agreement could be discharged,
the fact that D provided greater consideration for settlement of the fraud
claim is of no consequence since C will be unable to collect on the settlement agreement. Thus, the parties32are at an impasse, and must fully adjudicate the underlying fraud claim. 1
Likewise, if the parties are in a forum that looks to the underlying
nature of the debt, C above has every incentive to settle and release the
fraud claim against D because the settlement agreement preserves the underlying nature of the debt in the subsequent bankruptcy action.1 33 D,
however, has no incentive to negotiate a settlement because the debt obligation originating in fraud remains intact and is not dischargeable in bankruptcy.
Congress clearly intended to make certain categories of debt unavailable for discharge in bankruptcy.' 34 The discharge in bankruptcy is
intended to assist the good-faith but unfortunate debtor to return to economic productivity by allowing him to escape from the burden of overwhelming debt.135 The bad-faith debtor, however, is not treated the same
way under the Code because it precludes the discharge of debts that are the
product of fraudulent conduct or statements.1 36 Additionally, the bad-faith
debtor, in confronting the fraud claim, has at least raised the issue of his

See supra notes 100-02, 112-13.
See supra note 46 and accompanying text; see also cases cited supra note 11.
See cases cited supra note 14.
Indeed, a clever and unscrupulous debtor, one who may have already acted in a
fraudulent manner to produce the debt, might eagerly seek to execute a settlement agreement knowing any obligation under the agreement is dischargeable in bankruptcy. Conversely, the unscrupulous debtor might forego any type of reasonable settlement offer if
such agreement would establish a nondischargeable debt.
133 See cases cited supra note 14.
134 See 11 U.S.C. § 522 (2000) (specifying categories of debts automatically discharged in bankruptcy).
135 See In re Boone, 215 B.R. 386, 390 (Bankr. S. D. I11.1997) (describing notion of
"fresh start" through bankruptcy).
136 See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
129
130
131
132
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poor conduct or character, thereby inviting a more vigorous
review by the
137
bankruptcy court before any debts should be discharged.
The argument that the debtor bargained for the release from its liability under the fraud claim by executing the settlement agreement is unavailing because whether the claim remained unsettled, fully adjudicated,
or resolved through the settlement agreement, the liability to pay the creditor under the settlement agreement originally arose from the debtor's alleged fraudulent activities. 138 By adopting the position of the District of
Columbia and Eleventh Circuits, 39 the Court is merely permitting the
creditor to challenge the dischargeability of the settlement agreement debt
by undertaking a thorough examination of the factual circumstances underlying the original fraud claim."4 The creditor still must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the debtor engaged in fraudulent activities. 4' To hold otherwise denies the creditor its claim to the debt under the
settlement agreement, something which it likely did not intend to forego in
executing the agreement.
V.

CONCLUSION

In adopting the reasoning by the District of Columbia and Eleventh
Circuits that a settlement agreement arising from the debtor's fraudulent
activities is a nondischargeable debt under § 523(a)(2)(A) of the Federal
Bankruptcy Code, the Supreme Court would reaffirm Congress's intent in
preventing the dishonest debtor from benefiting from his fraudulent actions. Such a rule would permit a creditor to fully adjudicate its fraud
claim against the debtor, and promote uniform application of the Federal
Bankruptcy Code, a principal cornerstone of that body of law.
VI. ADDENDUM
Following the completion of this Note, but prior to publication, the
United States Supreme Court, by a seven to two margin, reversed and remanded the Fourth Circuit's decision in In re Warner."42 Justice Stevens

137 See supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text.
138 See Cohen v. de la Cruz, 523 U.S. 213, 221 (1998) (interpreting § 523(a)(2)(A)

nondischargeability as encompassing all liabilities arising from debtor's fraudulent actions).
139 See In re Spicer, 57 F.3d at 1152 (holding underlying fraudulent nature of debt
determinative for dischargeability purposes); Greenberg, 711 F.2d at 152 (holding same).
140 See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
141 See Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 288 (1991) (holding creditor must prove
nondischargeability under § 523 by preponderance standard).
142 See Archer v. Warner, No. 01-1418, slip op. at 8 (U.S. Mar. 31, 2003), rev'g,
Archer v. Warner, 283 F.3d 230 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding settlement agreement does not
preclude creditor from proving fraudulent origin for dischargeability purposes).
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joined Justice Thomas in issuing a dissent. 143 The majority held that while
a settlement agreement may work a novation for purposes of the state law
claims, it does not preclude a creditor from showing that the settlement
debt arose out of the debtor's alleged fraudulent conduct and thus survive
as a nondischargeable debt. 144 Specifically, the majority found that the
settlement debt which the Archer's sought to preserve was logically indistinguishable from the consent decree held nondischargeable in Brown v.
Felsen.145 The majority viewed the settlement agreement as leaving one
remaining "relevant debt," i.e., the debt represented by the agreement itself. 14 6 The Court reasoned that if the stipulation and consent decree in
Brown did not prevent the bankruptcy court from examining the nature of
the underlying debt (in order to determine whether it was obtained by
fraud), then the settlement agreement in the instant case likewise does not
preclude the bankruptcy court from undertaking a full inquiry into the origins of Warner's debt to Archer. 47 Moreover, the Court reiterated its opinion that Congress, in amending § 523 of the Bankruptcy Code, "'intended
the fullest possible inquiry' to ensure that 'all debts arising out of' fraud
are 'excepted from discharge,' no matter what their form. ' 48 This policy
permits the bankruptcy court, rather than
the state court, to undertake the
49
1
determination.
dischargeability
relevant
Justice Thomas in his dissent argued that the majority's decision
was based on the "erroneous premise" that "the settlement agreement does
not resolve the issue of fraud.' 50 The dissent distinguished the "blanket
release" executed by Archer and Warner from the consent decree and
See Archer v. Warner, No. 01-1418, slip op. at 1 (U.S. Mar. 31, 2003) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (arguing settlement clearly demonstrates party's intent to resolve fraud issue
143

including dischargeability determination).
144 See Archer v Warner, No. 01-1418, slip op. at 8 (U.S. Mar. 31, 2003).
14' 422 U.S. 127, 128-29 (1979), cited in Archer v. Warner, No. 01-1418, slip op. at 5
(U.S. Mar. 31, 2003)).
146 See
147 See

Archer v. Warner, No. 01-1418, slip op. at 3 (U.S. Mar. 31, 2003).
id. (applying reasoning of Brown to context of settlement agreement).
148 See id. at 6 (citing Brown, 422 U.S. at 128).
149 See Archer v. Warner, No. 01-1418, slip op. at 6 (U.S. Mar. 31, 2003) (noting debt
dischargeability not directly at issue before state court and implying bankruptcy court to be
proper forum). The Court also addressed Warner's alternative argument that Archer's
dismissal of the original fraud action is treated as litigated and determined in Warner's
favor under North Carolina law. Id. at 7. Archer, therefore, would be barred on collateral
estoppel grounds from claiming a nondischargeable debt originating in fraud under the
Bankruptcy Code. Id. The Court noted that the Fourth Circuit did not address the issuepreclusive effect of the settlement agreement, and stated that it was outside the scope of the
question presented. Id. The Court ultimately left the issue to "[tihe federal judges who deal
regularly with questions of state law," and remanded the case to determine whether the
issue was properly raised or preserved. Id. at 7-8. (citing Butner v. U.S., 440 U.S. 48, 58
(1979)).
150 See Archer v. Warner, No. 01-1418, slip op. at 1 (U.S. Mar. 31, 2003) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
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stipulation in Brown, and as such viewed the novation theory articulated in
In re West as controlling.' 5' Relying on the Court's precedent that a creditor must demonstrate the causal nexus between the debtor's fraudulent
conduct and the debt, 52 the dissent viewed the settlement agreement as
tantamount to a superceding event in a negligence action, thereby severing
the causal relationship
between the debtor's action and the resulting set53
tlement debt.
Stephen R. Bentfield

1-51See id. at 2 (citing In re West, 22 F.3d 775, 778 (7th Cir. 1994)); see also supra
notes 100-10 and accompanying text (articulating novation theory as replacing tort-based
debt with contract debt dischargeable in bankruptcy).
152 See id. at 5 (arguing debtor's fraudulent conduct must proximately cause debt
under § 523(a)(2)(A)); see also supra notes 74, 80-83 and accompanying text (setting forth
creditor's burden of proof in fraud exception to discharge under § 523(a)(2)(A)).
113 See id. at 4-5.

